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INTRODUCTI-0.

The subject of this thosis from a practical point
of view has grown to groat ivrortanc; durin.1 tho last century.
This has been brought about b- t"e introdhctic>
railro .,

z.hich

-ook the 'lr:.v

of that :.ci:'n>.

of the stoam
i)dC of con-

Before thlat time the various doctrines which were laid
down to regulate the liability of Masters and Servants were
of very little importance and their use was very seldom
invoked.

Now all is changed.

Instcad of the slow and

practically safe stage coaches, we have the whole country
intersected with the steam railway on which accidents happen
every hour.
Alt ough some of the Roman roads, like the Appian Way,
were a near approach to tho modern railway, yet they differed
in many important particulars.

They were simply granite

stonoc fitted tightly together upon ',.hich low wagons were
pushed along.
The first

of

odea
tracks for the wheels to run

-2-

upon was not brought into practice until the yoar 1676.
This although not a inode.'n railvwy waz otill
it

it.

was not until the year 1829,

a stop towards

that steam was in

way used for the purposes of propelling the cars.

any

In this

year the Liverpool and 11anchoster railroad was built which
although slow and cunbe-some,

was still

a great success.

Upon this basis the railway has devoloped until today it

is

one of the greatest wonders of the age.
With the developmont of the railway that vexed and
troublesome question, as to whether and in what cases the
Company is liable for injuries to their employees, has been
raised.

WHO AR3; 7E-APLOYT'K. S.

The first question to be conlsidered on this subject
is who are employees.
The comwmon and the legal understandings of the word
em.loyue is

not the same.

The latter

is

broader and com-

prehends not only the former but cases in which the parties
are employer and employee only in

a peculiar sense., and for

certain purp-oses.
According to the coimnon unde2standing an employee is
who engaes in

the service of anothrr,

one

for the purpose of

doing some la,;ful labor for a consideration.
The case of

Hill v. Liorey, 28 Vt.,178, is a very good

case to show the distinction betweoen the two.
plaintiff

and defendant wore engaged in

fence.

WVhile so engaged one Stuyveso:;,

There the

repairing a line
came along and

without any request at all from the defend at began helping
him.

While so engaged he cut down trees which belonged to

plainltiff.

Thereupon plaintiff' sued defendant for trespass

and the court held that Stuyveo-on vas zcn employec

of the de-

-2fendant although his services were gratuitously and had not
been asked for by the plaintiff.
it

Accordingly

hao been held that when one persian for

the time being, places hirself in the position of a subordinate to another in the business of the latter and by what he
may do in that condition of subordination a third party is
injured,

sich third party has a rig)ht to regard him as occu-

pying the position of an employee.
The importance of determining whether a man is an employee or not can be seen from the case of Everhart v. The
Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R.Co.,

78 Ind.,

(92.

Here

one Everhart, at the request of the conductor of a freight
train, climbed on a car for the purpose of putting on a brake.
While on the car the engineer carelessly and willfully uncoupled the car
injured.

nd Everhart was thrown off and permanently

The point in question in this case ,,as whether

Everhart by getting on the car became a co-em-)loyee of the
enr ineer or not--

If

he di . he could not recover.

was held by C.J.VWordess,
could recover;

But it

that he was a mere volunteer and

but that if he had been a co-emiployee he

could not.
'ljothor
HIaving dotorined v'

a person is

.n

employee or not

the next thing to be considered io tho employor's lilbility
to him in case of accidont.

-4TUI-

LIABILITY OF THE' 'OIIPATY

FOR

INJURIES TO THEIR 0PLOTI]ES .

It

is

a general rule followed in both England and

the United Z]tates that a servant who is

injured by the negli-

genco or misconduct of his fellow-servant can maintain no
action 4against the company for such injury.
This rule was first laid dovm by Lord Abinger in the
celebrated case of

Priectly v. Fowler, 5 U & W., 1,

and

became settled law of England ever after.
In 1841, this principle was declared in South Car~lina,
without any reference to the English case, in the case of
Murray v.

S.C.R.R.Co.,

I 1cMulln,585.

Although no refer-

ence was nade to the English case the doctrine. was substantially the same.
The f acts in the ,.se
by the S.C.R.R.Co.,

vere that one mluarray was employed

as a second fiicman,

and put on a train

manned by a competent engineer and fireman.

Vhile approach-

ing a tunnel a horse vwus observed to be feeding on the track.
The engine-;r's attenation vas dran to this fact but he paid

-5-

no attention to it, until they vicro almost upon the animal.
It being then to late to stop, the horse was run over, and
the engine thrown from the tra1c.

At this moment Murray

attempted to jump but his foot caug t in the tender and was
cut off.
It was admitted by both oarties that the accident was
caused ;,hclly through t--e negligence of "h

m,ninfr.

After receiving all the facts, C.J.EvLns laid down the
rule that an cmfloye.r lwas not liable for injuries received by

an <vemrployec

through the negligence or misconduct of a co-em-

ployee.
One year after,
Fassell v.
ton by

in 1842, tnis doctrine was affirmed in

The opinion was writB.& W.R.R.Co., 4 Miet .,49,.
the most noted case or
thout o
yis

.J$a,

iJ1 is

' Ltot

this ;point th:at hts boon dzcided in this country or in England.

The factc. were those:

One Farrell u,
as employed by

the Railway Company as an engineer on a )assenger

train.

The train was thrown off the track through the negligcnce of
a c-7it o n.a..

By -his act Farrl's

l:id v. crushed and

he brought an action against the Company for damages.

The

-6-points fully

learned Justice after dicu..ss ing the
concludes by saying;

that,

who enga 'Cs in

1

the crploy-

ment of another for the performance of specified duties and
services for compeonsationI takes upon himself the natural and
ordinary riske and perils incident to the performance of such
servico.

They are perils which he is as likely to know, and

against which he can as effectually gvard, as the master.'
I Regarding it

in

this light,

it

is

the ordinary case of one
in

sustaining an injurycin the courso of his own employment,

which he must bear the loss himself', or seek his remedy if he
The loss must be

has any, against the actual vrongdoer.1"
deemed to be the result of pure :_.Ccident,
all

men,

in

all employments,

less exposed;'

and at all

lihe those to which

tiries,

art". more or

,nd like similar losses from accidental

causes, it must rest where it first fell."
The policy and justice of this doctrine has been much
questioned, and the rule itself has been rejected in the
states.
As a rule of law it

is

ntdoubtedly an unjus-

one.

For

why should not an employee recover just as much and just as

-7readily if he is injured by a co-employee as h

'.7ould if

injured by the master himself?

-.
fy difference,

I cannot sco

and although England and forty-tvwo st;.tes hold so.

I will

be inclined to side with Kentucky & Tennessee which have established or rather havc never accepted the doctrine.
The Company is lia.le for the negligent aots of its
employees to third
so upon what

crsons who are not connected with them

rinCiplos of justice is the reason of the rule

that a class of persons who occupy an inferior position as
servants of the road, and w;ho are injurc d by the negligent
acts of those occupying a parallel position, should not have
the right to recover against the Company for damages sustained.

I can see none.

Tennessee in the case of Haynes v. E.Tenn. &. Ga. R.R.Co.
3 Coldwell, 222,

repudiates this doctrine entircly on the

ground that there is no sound reasoning at all in the cases
of llurray v. S.C.R.R.Co.,

and Farewell v. B. & l.R.R.Co..

Chief Justice Slacefford delivered the opinion of the
Court.

:rter

oing over and discussing all the points in

the cse fully he says,

" The high charaCter- and rearing of

-8many of the jurists, who havo ennunciated this principle
would have an infli--c-co with this Court in the dtcolrination
of this oucstion;

but upon an examination of tho authorities

cited., wo are unable to see upon what principle a rule that
seems to us not foundcd in justice, nor cormuion right should
be upheld or maint-ined."
11entucky also refused to recognize this doctrine in the
case of Collin v. The Tenn. c Nashville R.R.Co.,

In this

case she allovior-1 a cormon laborer to recovo' damages which
had been causcd by the

:cliience of an engineer.

But by a

careful study of the case she ca--.nnot be said to have entirely
repudiated but only to have limited the rule.

She seems to

agree with the other states that an employce cannot recover
for injury brought about by the negligence of a co-employee
with this limitation.

She holds that if the injury is

brought about by the gross nogligence of a co-employeethe
company is
The l

liable.
ow
en this point in Vfisconsin seems to have been in

great confusion up to l873.
v. The ,1.8. M.R.R.Co.,

In 1858, the case of Chanberlain

7 Wis.,425 arose.

In this case the

-9an ex-ress

plaintiff

i,-,nt on the road was hired to fill

one trip

the -lace of a braeman who

gaged in

this kork he

crushed.

Ti1c en-

ras sic.

,ras thrown from the car and had his log

The acici ont happened through the neglirence of
Alihough the question at point did not come

the engineer.
squarely up,

for

it

,-as decided by Justice Cole in

a very well

written opinion that had he been a co-emnloycc of the engineer
he would not have been aloced to recover.
appealed on tis

The case was then

point and the prior decision reversed.

Justice Paine in giving the opinion for ieversing it says,"
It is conceded that the Company is bound to conduct the force
it

sets in motidn with proper care and skill

so upon what

princi:le can it be maintained that they nay, through their
engineer zo negligontly rianage the engine as to mangle the
brakeman and all their ot-er sorvonts on the train and yet
be entirely irresponsiblc?"
This decision seeningly put the law on this question at
rest -but not for long, foir three years after in 1861, another
case arose which resulted in the overruling of Chamrberlain v.
M.& M'.R.R.Co., and the substitution of' the general rule de-

-10clared in

M4urray v.

S.C.R.R.Co.,

This was the case of A*osely v.

and FZa'roll v.
Chav:-erlain,

D.& W.R.R.Co.

18 'iis.,731.

The opinion ii this case was written by Chief Justice Dixon
who overrules Chsanmbc.ain v.

I7. C I .R.R.Co,

apparently withthat

The only argument which he gives is

out any reasons.

all the rest of the states have gone the other way so he
thinks \is cons in

Chould to.

This decision was so openly unjust and sujh a feeling
among the different membeesS of the beich that the legislature
passed a ztatute which decla.red this decision should not
apply to the enmployees of railways.
consin

put at rest.

'"hich rule is
one in

Thus the law in Wis-

Tenn.

right t:e ono laid down in

will probably never be ILnoan;

Uss.

or the

but were I

to

decide I should most assuredly side with Tennessee.
It is said by most courts that when a person contracts
to do services on a railroad he taX s into account all

the

dangers a °id perils which are incident to the enployont,
I

but

claim tY).t this can only be intended to mean such dangers

and perils as necessarily attend the business vThe*.

conducted

with ordi;rary caru

ad prudencc.

cannot be

He ctainly

prcsumed' to contract with refe-ronce to injuries inflicted on
him by negligence.
The Railway Company in setting a force in motion is
bound to see that it is employed with proper care and skill.
Other

have decided with IIassachusetts but 6n an
(tates

entirely diffecnt

ground---

that of public policy.

said that cmployous would be more vigilant to prevent
ies from the negligonce of each other,
could not recover damages,

if

It is
injur-

they knew that they

against the Company , than they

would with the opposite belief.
-t

this notion, it seems to me, is based upon a false

estimate of the motives which govern hriian action.

In fact

the argunent on public policy I think is just the other way.
By just so much as the liability of the employer for the
negligence of his servan-t is

reduced, by just so much are

the motives diminished w4hich induce him to employ servants
of the great_,est skill
laxation,
large,

mid vigi..

And if

negligence servants are emnployed,

as well as the other employees,

from this re-

the public at

run the hazard of the

-12-

It is suggestcd in 7arrell v.

3.J

7.R.R.Oo., that an

employec vhon he sees th&at negligent p-rso:;s are om-,ployed,
may leave the service.
Carriod out.

'3uppose t.lat ti'suggestion -ia

Those o-i-loyecs ,,-Ao arc cacf'ul, Vi

t

and

attentive to their busin;ess findig that their are others
emploued who art. negli-('nt or reckless, vould. leave the service, in obedince to the advice of the Supreme Court of 1.1ass.
'hoere vould the ,'lffare of the pub,-lic b

then?

All

the skillful and careful servants gone the iubli.c would be
left to the mercy of a handful of carnless and negligent
persons.

-13WHO ARE CO-E2I1PLOYEES.

Who are co-omployees and who are not is

p-robably

one of the most difficult questions that tLc Amc1,,ican Courts
have ever had to dfeal with.
. On account of this difficulty there are hardly two states
in

the whole union that have oxactly the sao
The rule which is

rule.

given by most text-writers

co-employee id one who serves the same employer;

is

that a

deriving

their authority and compensation from the same source, and
engaged in the same business, although it be in different
grades and departments thereof, arc fellow or co-servants,
each taking the risk of tihe other's negligence.
But this definition is

to broad and svoeping, and by a

oareful reading of the cases I doubt if you could find a
singl,, state which does not have a groat iany exce-tions to it.
For exaple it ha., '(eOn held in Ohio that where a serva.t was on-.aged in repairing a track, and was injured through
the carelessness of a fireman that the rule did not apply.

Still

ith a few exceptions it can be laid down as the

-14-

general rule in all the statcs except
Indiana,

T"cntilcky,

We.

Yfass., Ohio,
Yor},

&rA Tennessee.
on this point soers to be the best,

The 1a .: in N.Y.,

most clea: and certain of all

the stu.tes.

The Courts of other states seem to have laid clovm very
arbitrary rules and regulations while the Courts of I.Y.,
have been riore lenicnt and equitable

:o the ciT'p)loyee.

This

can be seen by a study of the late-, decisions.

The rule b.

the

,-ich

who are co-employees is
tion engaged in
machinery,

1.ov-rK s ,lled
are gu

this:

wle

Any e-loyee of the corpora-

providing to other cYaployecs,
-.

tools and aDilimnces to work with,

and rules and regulations of employment is
and the Corporation is
are injurocl,

thlough

l

.le

,is

who ore not cmployce: in

detormining

in

co-o,1iloyees,

a vice-principal

damages to all

negligence.

a place to work,

employees who

Allother employees

providing eaiy of these things are

co-em-ploy ees o
Thi_ ,
casei s

T 4..tnk,

Vill show.

injuries

'
can safely be sailc
to be the rule as the

Thus a brakemun can recover gamages for

eceived thougl']

the

'lJigolnce

of a track repairer,

-15-

man could recover for injuricS
of a Mechanic in

to wro-1.
tace

is -roviding a

as the track rCrA-i: 'r

A firo-

th, negligence

ceived throh

t.c car shops, who had been negligent in
in

was

fixing a brake;

furnisL-ing

machinery-, tools, and a;Dlianccs for the firoman to work with.
A brakoman couldc recover for injurics receivd. through the
negligrcc; of a train disioatche", who h.- the authority and
did make rules for the running of trzlins.

could also recover for
genc of a

JL.,r

.nt whose
.ch......

re-cive
t

An engineer

through the negli-

Ju;erinas to make rules and

regulat ions.
The Ohio Courts in dete-mining this question sem to go
upon the question of subordination or the -:ranlk and grade test
as it is most comnonly called.

This rule was first declared

in the Little hia..ai R.R.Co. v. Stevens,
erigno~n
R.

a,--,iured in a

He, Stevens an

the Little
o,_!isston,
on

Liu-ii R.

, - e arid carelessThe collission was due to the negli:;o

ness of the conductor of the train.

The Court allowed the

engineer to recover, saying, that he a;nd the conductor were
in

..
subordinate positions and so were ,t

-.c,,-.loyeos, but

-16and vice-principal.

wore rathor in tho position of orployce

After discussing all the roints fuuly thuy decided that whore
ner the direct-

an floycr olaces one -erson in his or-,loy
ions of another, also in

his employ, such employer is liable

for injmrio.s to the. porson of him -laced in the subordinate
situation.
The Lake 2hor

This case was followed in
.R.Co. v.

Souther-n

Tavalley, 36 O.S.R.,221.

a car repairer was ordered by one Fox,
car fcarthe

a freit

the freigh'

car an ct: n

ichigan

There Tavalley

a foremmn to go under

of repairin-

o

&

tched a ho-

it.

While under

coal car on the

track which cane in collision with the car Tavalley was under.
noving of the car severely injured him.

The srd.n
Court held

ha. t ho coirmany was liable.

The

Justice Vaite,

in

giving the opinion said that Tavalley could recover as he was
a subordinate and under the di ections of Fox whose duty it
was to take all all precautions to guar d against such accidents.

According in

cther ca.ses.o

is not a co-employee of a broan.
a common la-borer in

a car-shop,

they holC that a conductor
Nor a master mechanic of

-17The law in

KEntucky on this point favors the employee

more than the law of any other st-P.ate wi'tl

the siagle exception

of Tennessee which has nevor. adopted -cho rule of Co-employee
The first time that a case of this

non-liability at all.

kind ever came up was in 1865, in

The Louisvill & Nashville

!lere a commnon laborer was ordered by

R.R.Co., v. Collins,

an cnginecer to get under an engine for the purpose of fixing
it.

While so engaged the engine moved forward and cut his

leg off.

It

was mrovod on the trial

that the engineer was

grossly negligent in not blocking the wheels of the engine
before setting the laborer at work.
Company was liable.

The Court held that the

Judge Robinson in delivering the opin-

ion of the Court said,"

In running its cars the Company is

requited to observe at least,

ordinary care,

skill so far as strangers are concerned.,'

vigilance and
'Had the appelle

been a stranger, the appellant would., therefore, have been
certainly liable on this action and ae cannot admit that the
appellants relation as an cmployee whould exempt the Company
from that general liability,'

Conrnon laborers in their em-

ployment having nothing to do wIith t?.e.cars or the running of

-18them, they, like the Companies mere wood choppers, are comparitive strangers to the engineer,

,

ard his running oper-

ations, and should be entitled to all the security of strangers.

They know nothing of the skill or care of the engineer

nor have they any control over him.

They are not therefore

in the essential sense of contradistinctivo classification.
In the soac service with him.'

'

The only consistent or

maintainable principle of the corporations responsibility is
that of agency.'

It is, the-oefore, resposible for the

negligence of its engineers, as its controlling agent in the
management of its locomotives and running cars, and that responsibility is graduated by the classes of persons injured
by the engineers' neglect or want of skill-- as to strangers,
ordinary negligence is sufficient--

as to subordinate em-

ployees, associated with the engineer in running the cars,
the negligencc must be gross--

but as to employees in a dif-

ferent department of service, ordinary negligence may be sufficient."
This case was followed in Z.& 11.R.R. v.Robinson, 4 Bush,
507.

Hero a brakeman was run over by an engine.

It

was

-19proven that tho cirineor was grossly negligent,

and the Court

held that the Compa. .y vrs liable.
The rule therefore

in Kentucky as laid dovn

by these

cases depends upon the degree of negligence and that only.
If the injury

es caused by an employee in a different depart-

ment, the company is liable if there has been ordinary negligoncn,.

And as to subordinate employees in the same gener-

al service the negligence mnust be gross.

-20DUTIES OF THE RAILROAD COMPANY TO T FMIR 7i PLOYEEO.

Railway Companies must use reasonable care in
nishing a safe place to work.

fur-

They must use reasonable care

in selecting machinery, tools, and appliances to work with.
They must use reasonable care in

selecting co-employees to

see whether they are competent and skillful.

And he must

make reasonable rules and regulations for -their safety.

And

they must use care in the original construction and subsequent maintainance in repair of its lines.
These are the rules laid down by all text book writers
as the duties which a railroad owes to its employees.

But

thoese requirements can be waived by the employee and will
be, if

he knowing the ;.dfc~ts as well as his employers,

proceeds with his work without protest.
an wmployee who knows of any defect
notify his employer at once.

in

still

it is the duty of
those requirements to

If he knows of these defects

alad still goes on and works, saying nothing about them he is
estopped from setting up the negligence of the company.
This was decided in the Massachusetts case of Ladc v. New

-21Bedford R.R.Co.
by a train,

There Ladd was a road master and was injured

on which he was riding being thrown over an onThe cars on the train had no check chains and

bankment.

that he knew that it
them.

was dcngorous for a train to run without

Upon this evidence the Court held that it was the

duty of Ladd to notify the Company of their absence abd as he
did no* he was estopped from recovering damages by his own
negligence.
The question then arises what must the employee do upon
discovering some defect to hold the company liable.
h'a

7

.

in

a groat number of cases.

He must

leave the ccrnpnary or notify the company ot its
defects.

If after kavitg given such notice

This

agent of such
,

the Company

promises to make necessary repairs, and requests the employee
to remain in their service, the Company is liable for all
damages which may arise tkrough such defects before they are
repaired.

This was decided in Patterson v. Pittsburg &

Connellsville R.R.Co.
freight train.

There Patterson was a conductor of a

It was his duty to switch certain coal cars

off on a switch, for the purpose of unloading the coal on a

-22Platform.

The switch wcs very dangerous on account of the

shortness of the curve, and the improper construction of the
frog.

The plaintiff knew of these defects and notified

the Company.

The company promised to remedy them and re-

quested plaintiff to reltain in their employ while such repairs were being made.

The plaintiff

did remain and was

injured by having a car run off the switch upon which he
was riding.

The Court held that the Company were liable.

THE DUTY OF THE RAIL.W'AY CO14PANY AS TO THE EXERCISE OF CARE ON
ITS P ART IN THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTIO.,

INSPECTION.

AND MAIN-

TAINANCE IN PiPAIR OF ITS LINES., ROLLING STOCK AND APPLIANCES.

The company does not guarantee to their employees
that thoir lines,
condition.

appliances,

a.:cI machinery are in

a safe

They only, guarantee that they will exercise

due care in building and keeping in repair such lines and
machinery.
They are lot bound to supply the best appliances on
the market, but they must supply such appliances as are reasonable safeo and suitable,
supply. in

or such as any prudent person would

similar circumstances.

Foliowing these rules the Courts of different states
have held that the Company need not supply all of the latest
inventions,

That they are not liable-because the road bed

is intersected with ditches;
not blocked;

because its switch frogs are

nor because its car platforms are of unequal

heights.
But it

is

a railway duty to make frequent and thorough

-24inspections of its

line and appliances.

railway may be assured that its

In

ordor that a

lines and appliancos are in

a safe condition they are bound to make such frequent and
thorough inspections as can be done consistently with the
conduct of its business.
It is impossible to lay down precise rules as to determine when a company has been negligent im making inspections
and when it has not.
own facts.

Each case raust be determined by its

Under circumstances of more than ordinary peril,

as in the case of violent storms, the Company must inspect
its lines with more than ordinary care and promptness.
The Company is liable for all negligence in the original
construction of its lines, and, although a competent contractor has been employed for that purpose.
The Courts of a great nany states hold that when a railway Company receives cars for transportation from another line
it raust make a thorough inspection to see whether they are
safe and in good repair.

If they are not they should refuse

to handle them until such defects have been repaired.

But

the same Courts hold that this rule only externds to obvious

-25defects, and not to latent.
Co.,

In Golleib v. N.Y.L.E.& W.R.R.

the Company was held liable to a brakem-an who was in-

jured while coupling cfefective cars which had been received
from another line for transportaion.

Earle J. said,

"1

The

defendant was unfer obligations to his employees to exercise
reasonable care and diligence in furnishing them safe and
suitable instriuments,
of their duty,.'

'

cars,

and ,*.achinery for the discharge

The defect was an obvious one easily dis-

covered by the most ordinary inspection, and it would seem
to be the grossest negligence to put such cars into any train2'
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THE LU2Y OF TKE COMPANY AS TO
THE SEL1ICTICN A/AN

RETENTION OF ShLRVANTS.

A railway Company rmust use due care in its selection
If it is in

and retention in its service of its employees.
any way negligent,

it

But in

may arise.

-vill be liable for all

damages whic7

order to render the Company liable it

must be shown that the negligence of the incompetent servant
was the oroximate cause of the accident, and that the officer
who is charged with the duty of appointing and dismissing
servants either knew or ought t

have known of the servant's

incompotency.
The Company will be liable if

it

keeps in

its

service an

employee whose habits are Lnowrn to be intemperate.

This

was decided in the case of Decker v. H.& B.T.R.& C.Co.,82
Pa.St.,119.
train.

In this case Decker was an engineer on a coal

One Bowser was a cond&ctor on another train.

cars were running in

opposite directions,

The

and the train dis-

patcher gave Bowser directions to lot the coal train pass at
a certain place.

He was intoxicated and did not obey the

-27instructions.
was killed.

The trains came into collision and Decker
It

habitually drunk,

vas proven on the trial

that Bowser was

and that the Co-pany knew of it.

The

Court thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the
ground that the Company were liable for keeping an habitual
drunkard in

their employ.

The Company will also be liable for keeping in its
employ a conductor who cannot °i e depended upon and who
always disobeys orders.

-28AS TO THlE RULES AND

JE]GULATIONS

WHICH TE COIPANY ARE OBLIGED TO 11AKE.

Every railroad is bound to establish and ebforce
such rules and regulations as arq necessary for the safety of
their servants.

What these rules should be will depend on

the circustuces in cach case.
.Anon,-, the most important ones are these.

The Company

should lay dovm rules regulating the speed of trains.
which determine the exact duty of each employee.
road is a single track, rulos should be laid dovr
govern the passing of trains.

Rules

If the
which will

There are a great many others

which might be named, but these will suffice for examples.
At one time there was a great many

as
-sputes
to whether

the Company would be liable for damages brought about by the
brpea.ng cf these rules I-% a co-eploorco,

but I think that

by a careful reading of the cases at the present time that
it is easily determined.
,'Tho case of Rose v. B. & H.R.R.Co.,

5, H.Y.,217,

to settle the law in N1ew York on this point.

e,

The case arose

-29in

The

Rose was a brakeman on a freight train.

this way.

trains should nct be

Company had established a rule that its

A conductor

of each other.

started within ten rnute

and co-employee of Rose violated this rule by sending out
three trains from East Albany at four minutes intervals.
The head train broke ijito and collidudl]ith

the second.

Rose

was thrown from his car by the collision and killed.
Johnston J.

in writing the opinion !-.id

down the r-ule

that the Company would not be liable for an injury brought
about by the disobedience of the rules of the Company by a
co-omployee.
-his ruc

has been generally followed in

all

the states.

But On the other hnxnd it has been held by sood authority that
a Railway. Company is

liable if

it

knowingly permits its

ployees to habitually disregard the rules.
0.&

M.R.R. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261.

em-

This was held in

In this case a brakeman

was injured by the carelessness handling of an oxvgine by a
fireman.

On the trial

it

was proven that the engineer was,

to the knowledge of the Company, in the habit of trusting the
control of his engine to his fireran in disobedience to the

rules and regulations.

The Court hold that the Company was

a party to the negligence and was liable.

It

was further

hold thl-t the Comp1any would undoubtedly be liable for the

b--

17-

-

any of the rules unless i4

cayticn to guard against it.

Lih user

every pre-

-31STATUTES EFFECTiNG THE CO-EIAPLOYE

LIABILI2Y DOCTRINrE

In eight states of the Union statuts have been
passed which materially modify tho rules of co-employee lia=Ibility.

These states are Georgia, Kansas, Montana, Iowa,

Mississippi, Wyoming, and Rhode island.
These statutes iL.general declarc, that the Company shall
be liable to their employees for all negligence or mismanagement by their agents or other employees.

That is that if an

employee is injured through the negligence of a co-employee,
the.Compcnay is still liable unless the injury was brought
about through the carelessness of the person injured.
There is a great deal of difficulty as every lawyer will
admit with the doctrine of follow servant.

For over forty

years the Court-s of this clountry have been perplexed with
this troublesome question; and every decision rendered by the
Courts, instead of settline- it, has only produced new pvrplexities.
The whole trouble is

caused by the attempt of the Courts

to make a distinction between the different classes of ser-

-E2-

vants, instead of considering them all in one light.
Unless the l.egislaturcs of the vatious states pass a
statute settling this question at rest, the law of the subject will soon be in such a- state s
The reasons that have leeo

to be uttcerly valueless.

for exempting a Railway
S,_. ,c,

Company from liability for injury to one servant by the negligence of another servant are state(d in the case of
St.P.R.R.Co., v. Ross, 112 U..377.

C.Ti.&

Chief Justice Field de-

livered the opinion of' the Court and said, 11 The general
liability of a railway company for injuries caused by the
negligence of its servants, to iasscngers and others not in
its "service is conceded.'

'it covers all injuries to which

they do not contribute, but which injuries befall a servant
in

its employ a different principle prevails.'

'

engaged for the perfon.ace of specific services,

Having been
he takes

t]erewith.'

upon himself the ordinary ris]ts -cIdnt

As a
A

consequence, if he suffers by exposure to them, he cannot
recover compensation from his employer.'

'

The obvious reason

for this exception is that he has, or in law, is supposed to
have them in contemplation when he

-,a

i

the service,

17t7

and that his 6ompCnsation is
cannot,

in

reason,

if

voluntarily assumed,

-

arranged

accordingly.'

he suffers f'ro., a

' He

which he has

and for the assaumption of which he is

paid."
" There is also ;nother reason ofton assigned for this
exemption that of a supposed public policy.'

It is assumed

that the exemption operates as a stimulate to diligence and
caution on the part of the servant, for his own safety as
well as that of his master."
" Much potency is ascribed to this assumed fact by reference to those cases vhore dilige-ce mud caution on the
part of the servants cc:stitutes the chief p-'otection against
accidents.

But it

may be doubted whether the exemption has

the effect thus claimed for it.

We have never knovrn parties

more willingly to subject themsc~lves to dangers of life or
limb because, of losing the one, or suffering in the other,
dI2age-

could be recovered by their rerpresentatives

themselves for the loss or injury.

or by

The dread of personal

injury has always proved sufficient to bring into exercise the
vigilance and activity of the serva;nt."

-34This opinion written by Justice 1icld

is

considorcd to

be one of the best opinions ever v;rittoi. on this subject,
I thinLi gives fully the :ac

"

and

follow -ervant cloct-

-

rine'.
He disposes of the reason last assigne, . fully so but
little

-more need be said upon it.

that no fae.ages would be

To hold that the fact

iven would increase the servant's

regard for his own safety is to contradict and go against all
rules of hunan nature.

It would be utterly foolish to sup-

pose that a servant would be one d.e-roo less careful if he

were allowed to recover' d.:mes vwhi c

have ben

caused by

another and most likely an utter stranger to him.
The other reason given by Justice Field, to wit, that
the servant takes upon himself the ordihary risks incident to
the service, needs a- more careful consideration.
This may be a good doctrine but as applied by the Courts
at the present time it is to arbitrary, and hard.
at this doctrine it will be as-k1edk.
what

"

Looking

arc ordinary risks"

They are those risks which the Courts declare the servant
assumes.

71ho are the servants who assume these Risks?

They are these servants whom the Court arbitrarily says asThis seems to be the logic of the Courts

sume these risks.
at the :present time.

The Courts say that the servant has his conprensation
arranged according to the degree of danger,
not?

i s this so or

It may be so in theory but is certainly not in actual

practice.

Vhere is

there an employer who gives his servant

a larger compensation when he directs him to perform a dangerous service.

Where is

the railroad Company who pays,

those onployces, who risk their lives and limbs daily, more
than the employee,
risks.

It

who occupy a safe position and assume no

is just the opposite.

It

will be found by

actual exporience that those employees who occupy a safe
position are paid double the amount p-.id to those who put
their lives in danger ever:- moment.
It

seems to be a waste of tim,

to discuss the doctrine

of fellow servant if, indeed, there can be said to be any
settled doctrine in the U.S..

The reacns upon which it

is

supposed to be founded are manifest absurdities and should be
abolished.

All servants of the same -aster

should be upon

an cqual footing,

}
so far as their ri Cih6t
to recover for the

negligence of other servants is concerned.
Company should be liable in

all

The railroad

cases or ;-ot at all.

FINIS.

